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The dynamics of cluster entrepreneurship: knowledge legacy from parents or 
agglomeration effects? The case of the Castellon ceramic tile district 
 
 
Abstract: What are the main mechanisms driving the process of industry clustering? There is a tension 
between two different perspectives as regards explaining entrepreneurship and spatial concentration: the 
roles played by agglomeration economies and knowledge legacies passed on from parents to spawns or 
spinoffs.  Using qualitative interviews and archival data analysis, this paper tracks the evolution and the 
organizational reproduction of the ceramic tile cluster of Castellon (Spain) since its inception in 1727. 
Results show the existence of agglomeration and socially-based co-operation forces. Beyond de novo 
spinoffs, abundant social capital in highly agglomerated regions facilitates co-operation and new firm 
formation, and even co-operation amongst competitors to create new firms. Socially-based networks, 
reinforced by agglomeration externalities, all act as learning mechanisms to build pre-entry capabilities in 
new ventures, complementing Klepper’s inheritance perspective.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
Spatial concentration of an industry can be attributed to the benefits of agglomeration and socially-based 
co-operation, in combination with the influence of knowledge legacies in a complementary and synergistic 
process. Conclusions are framed within the knowledge spillover theory of entrepreneurship, shedding light 
on how entrepreneurship occurs in clusters.  
 
 





Spinoffs are considered of utmost importance for the development (Garvin, 1983; 
Agarwal et al., 2004; Chatterji, 2009) and spatial concentration (e.g. Dorfman, 1983; 
Kenney and von Burg 1999; Klepper 2007) of industries. The entrepreneurial 
phenomenon of industry clustering from new venture formation and the subsequent 
cluster1 evolution, which constitutes the purpose of this study, has received increased 
attention by industry economists and strategists (e.g. Cheyre, Klepper and Veloso, 2015; 
Wang, Madhok and Li, 2014; Klepper, 2011; Klepper, 2010; Buenstorf and Klepper, 
2009; Klepper, 2007) and from economic geographers (e.g. Cusmano et al., 2015; Costa 
and Baptista, 2012; Boschma and Wenting, 2007; Scott, 2006; Stuart and Sorenson, 2003; 
Sorenson and Audia, 2000; Phelps, 1992).   
Addressing spinoffs, two different yet intertwined perspectives claim to explain cluster 
formation and evolution through entrepreneurship or new firm formation: the influence 
of the knowledge legacies of the parents of entrepreneurial spinoffs (new independent 
firms, the founders of which worked previously in the same industry, inheritance 
approach) and the effects of agglomeration or externalities.  This unresolved tension calls 
                                                 
1 The terms industrial district, industrial cluster, cluster, district, geographical agglomeration, and agglomeration can 
be used interchangeably throughout the paper, although we recognize that some differences remain and our focus is 
based on Marshallian industrial districts (MIDs). 
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for further empirical research. Literature has explained the evolution of industries through 
spinoff formation, explaining the nature of spinoffs, the reasons why their founders leave 
incumbent firms and spinoff performance (e.g. Agarwal et al., 2004; Klepper and Sleeper, 
2005; Franco and Filson, 2006). This perspective has stressed incumbent-to-progeny 
capability transmission through an inheritance process by emphasizing an incumbent’s 
capabilities and its role influencing spinoff formation and performance. Capability 
transfer and inheritance process from incumbents (parents) to spinoffs (progenies), 
however, has argued that the effects of agglomeration only play a minor role in industrial 
spatial concentration because spillovers are confined to parents and their spinoffs and do 
not extend across co-located firms in general (Buenstorf and Klepper, 2009:730). In fact, 
this perspective allocates more importance to the influence of spinoffs’ internal 
knowledge inherited from parents at the time of entry, while agglomerations are only 
considered to be of minor significance2. This view asserts that the spinoffs inherit 
competencies from their experienced parents, which enables them to outperform other 
firms, minimizing the role of inter-firm relations.  
Inter-firm relations or interactions, however, constitute additional learning mechanisms 
to access to knowledge, as the relational view (Dyer and Singh, 1998) and the network 
approach (Powell et al., 1996) have argued. In this line of thought, from the economics 
perspective, Marshall, Arrow and Romer (MAR)  externalities (e.g. Glaeser et al., 1992), 
on the one hand, are economies of scale external to the firm but internal to a territorial 
system, facilitating agglomeration, due to the advantages of localisation, such as 
production costs reduction, access to specialised inputs and suppliers and the better access 
to learning due to the presence of knowledge or technology spillovers (e.g. Audretsch and 
Feldman, 1996; Klepper, 2011). MAR focuses on knowledge spillovers between firms in 
the same industry. Related to this idea of externalities, this study focuses on the specific, 
distinct social structure of geographic concentration or Marshallian approach to industrial 
districts (MID). The industrial district literature (MID), on the other hand, points out the 
social dimension (e.g., Becattini, 1979, 1990; Brusco, 1982; Piore and Sabel, 1984; 
Belussi and Hervas-Oliver, 2017) of agglomerations. Social ties, reinforced by 
continuous interactions reduce transaction costs and favour knowledge exchange, 
facilitating a model of network-based and flexible specialisation of production fuelled by 
subcontracting, fostering the co-existence of competition and co-operation that positively 
                                                 
2 Klepper (2007: 629), however, recognizes the potential role of agglomeration in cluster formation. 
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impacts innovation (e.g. Camagni, 1991; Belussi and Sedita, 2009). Specifically, 
industrial districts are socio-territorial entities which feature an active presence of both a 
community of people and a population of firms in one naturally and historically bounded 
area (Becattini, 1990). Within this MID perspective, it is said that higher founding rates 
are leveraged on the occurrence of dense local concentrations, meaning that  
entrepreneurship occurs within, and from out of, specific existing spatial and social 
structures: spinoff entrepreneurs learn the trade from existing cluster incumbents or social 
structures and not only from parents (Brusco, 1982; Sorenson and Audia, 2000; Stuart 
and Sorenson, 2003; Dahl and Sorenson, 2014), to the extent that in MIDs new ventures 
have social capital before entry (Sorenson and Audia, 2000).   In other words, knowledge 
inherited from parents is not the only way for new ventures in clusters to learn (cf. 
Saxenian, 1994; Cusmano et al., 2015): inter-firm relationships are powerful learning 
mechanisms, shifting the focal point from inheritance to inter-firm interactions and 
knowledge spillovers as capability-building constituents (e.g. Marshall, 1920; Glaeser et 
al., 1992; Audretsch and Feldman, 1996), even capable of contributing to spinoff 
generation (e.g. Saxenian, 1994; Stuart and Sorenson, 2003).  This MID perspective is 
also reinforced from strategy literature which, emphasizing the relational approach, 
explicitly recognizes that agglomerations lie behind the entrance of new firms (e.g. 
Kalnins and Chung, 2004; Alcacer and Chung, 2007; De Figueiredo et al., 2013; Wang 
et al., 2014; Alcacer and Chung, 2014). 
 
Such inconclusive tension between the two perspectives fragments theory and prevents 
the advance of knowledge in the topic. This article disentangles that tension and attempts 
to conciliate those perspectives within a comprehensive and integrative entrepreneurial 
framework, utilising the emergent perspective focused on the knowledge spillover theory 
of entrepreneurship (KSTE3, e.g. Agarwal et al., 2010) as theoretical connector of both 
inheritance and agglomerations mechanisms. KSTE addresses both perspectives and 
explains, on the one hand, those sources of opportunities fostered by entrepreneurs, based 
on the utilisation of underexploited knowledge created by others (Agarwal et al., 2004; 
2007; 2010; Acs et al., 2009), pointing out that founders’ past industry experience matters 
for both the creation and performance of new ventures resembling the inheritance 
approach. KSTE argues, on the other hand, that  context matters for entrepreneurship and, 
                                                 
3 Audrescth, Acs and other seminal authors adhere to this emergent theory. 
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specifically, localisation influences and shapes new venture creation, due to the fact that 
knowledge spillover in KSTE relates to knowledge flows that are un- or 
undercompensated (Agarwal et al., 2010:272-273), resembling the agglomeration view. 
Intersecting the combination of the inheritance and the agglomerations approach, KSTE 
sheds light on how entrepreneurship occurs in clusters and how entrepreneurship fosters 
spatial concentration of industries.  
 
We posit that externalities from agglomerations and socially-based co-operation, as 
additional to inheritance, both constitute a potential complementary explanation of why 
and how spinoffs emerge,  build their pre-entry and initial capabilities and foster industry 
concentration and subsequent cluster formation:  entrepreneurs, as well as learning from 
incumbents’ capabilities, also depend on context and activate networks of relationships 
in order to assemble resources and build their business model during the startup process. 
In this line of thought, we argue that in MIDs mechanisms fostering learning and 
capability building at pre-entry and at the time of spinoff founding are constructed by 
both the incumbents’ knowledge transfer (inheritance) and learning from localisation and 
social networking (agglomeration and socially-based co-operation) in a complementary 
and synergistic self-reinforcing process. The rationale of our relational argumentation is 
sustained on the basis that the locus of innovation and learning in clusters is found in 
inter-organisational networks (Powell et al., 1996:142; Saxenian, 1994; Uzzi, 1997; 
Sorenson and Audia, 2000), stressing  the importance of relationships in order to explain 
why geographical areas facilitate spinoff creation. In fact, as Chatterji (2009) posits, 
superior spinoff performance is not driven only by technological spillovers from parent 
to spawn.  
 
While past research has focused on assessing the impact of industry experience (e.g. 
Chatterji, 2009), or the influence of industry incumbents (e.g. Agarwal et al., 2004) on 
spinoff performance and how a knowledge legacy from parents to spawns explains spatial 
industry clustering (e.g. Klepper 2007), we leave spinoff performance and survival rates 
analysis to others. Our study focuses on disentangling the process of new firm formation 
in clusters and how each perspective, parents’ knowledge legacies and agglomeration, 
shapes the entrepreneurial process in a spatial context. Specifically, we ask: what are the 
mechanisms at work in the process of the creation of new firms and cluster evolution?  
For this, we seek to understand the learning mechanisms of new ventures at the time of 
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their entry into clusters, considering both the effects of parents’ legacies and that of 
agglomeration. Considering Gigerenzer’s  (1991) thesis of the non-neutrality of scientific 
tools associated with thinking and theory crafting, we leave survival rates analysis to 
others. Agglomeration mechanisms and their complex nuances are not easily grasped by 
simply measuring entry and exit rates. Rather, we engage in theory-building (Eisenhardt, 
1989; Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007) by utilising longitudinal case study research on the 
evolution of a cluster. Our study and method are both justified by the fact that although 
we observe that spinoffs in clusters are ubiquitous, yet the vast empirical literature in fact 
ignores the process of how those new ventures have learnt at the time of entry.  
We separate study of the mechanisms at work in the process of new firm formation in 
clusters from that of studying new venture performance because, following Stuart and 
Sorenson (2003), social ties that enable entrepreneurship and spatial concentration do not 
necessarily promote a better performance from new firms, due to the increased 
competition in agglomerations. We posit that in addition to the effects of a parent’s 
knowledge legacy, inter-firm and interpersonal social networks, i.e. MID externalities, 
are also key learning mechanisms for new ventures before entering. Agglomeration, 
therefore, favours a higher founding rate for new entrants in clusters and complements 
inheritance, extending KSTE.  In addition, the spinoff formation process, different from 
that of knowledge legacies remarked in Klepper’s studies, also follows a patterns 
characterized by parent-backed and collaborative new ventures. The latter is really novel 
and important for the literature, especially because those forms of entrepreneurship 
contribute to the understanding of vertical disintegration and the intense division of labour 
in MIDs.  
 
In our study, the focal process is the mechanisms at work in cluster formation and 
evolution through entrepreneurship, and the setting is the Castellon4 ceramic tile MID in 
Spain since its inception during the early eighteenth century up until 2010. The Castellon 
cluster has been labelled a Marshallian industrial district (Hervas-Oliver and Albors-
Garrigos, 2009). This characteristic makes the Castellon case different from the types of 
clusters typically analysed through the inheritance perspective, and this, along with our 
                                                 
4 The importance of the Castellon cluster is supported by its citation in Porter’s (1990:298-299) seminal work, which 
recognizes it as a key competitor against Sassuolo, an Italian ceramic tile cluster. Today, Castellon is a world-class 
ceramic tile pole. 
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access to a unique longitudinal database, makes this Marshallian industrial district well 
suited to our purpose.   
 
Our study contributes to entrepreneurship by connecting the specific case of 
entrepreneurship in industrial districts and their spatial and social context into the 
knowledge spillover theory of entrepreneurship (KSTE). Our study’s results highlight and 
extend two important components of KSTE perspective (e.g. Agarwal et al., 2007; 2010; 
Acs et al., 2009; Audretsch and Lehmann, 2005) and its application to clusters: the 
localized context and its related externalities from agglomeration, socially-based co-
operation and the effect of founders’ past industry experience, all shaping new venture 
creation in a complementary and synergistic way, supporting the emerging KTSE as a 
regional model of entrepreneurship (Plummer and Acs, 2014). In doing so, this study 
extends KSTE by addressing the still missing inter-firm level (Shu et al., 2014). 
Furthermore, this study also sheds light on the emphasis of context in entrepreneurship 
(Tan, 2006; Jack and Anderson, 2002). All in all, this study contributes to 
entrepreneurship and cluster literature by providing novel evidence of how 
agglomeration, socially-based co-operation and parents’ knowledge legacy mechanisms 
interplay to shape cluster evolution. Our results serve to enrich the economic geography, 
innovation and entrepreneurship literatures, disentangling and conciliating that 
inconclusive topic based on two differing perspectives.   
 
The paper is organized as follows. After this introduction, Section two presents a review 
of the literature and theory. Then, Section three presents the ceramic tile district of 
Castellon. Section four presents methods, including empirical design, data sources and 
data analysis. The latter addresses a brief and synthetic part showing the history of cluster 
evolution in order to contextualise, obtained from archival data analysis, and another part 
based on the qualitative analysis of data from interviews, discussing results. Finally, 
Section five concludes the study, highlighting the most significant contributions it makes 
to the literature.  
 
3 The Castellon ceramic tile district: an introduction 
Spain is a leading country in tile production. The Castellon ceramics tile district in Spain  
includes all the activities of the ceramic tile value chain, as well as various public R&D 
organisations such as the Institute of Ceramic Technology (ITC-ALICER, hereafter), 
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educational centres (including, for example, the Jaume I Universitat), and private 
institutions such as trade associations (including Ascer, Anffecc, and Asebec) (Hervas-
Oliver and Albors-Garrigos, 2007, 2009).  The ceramic tile industry in the cluster 
provides 14,300 direct jobs (in 2014), and encompasses around 200 firms5 plus 100 
auxiliary firms (in glazing and equipment), concentrating around 90% of Spanish and 
45% of European production.  The main activities consist of: the manufacture of 
equipment for tiles, production of ceramic tiles, frits and glazing processes (tile 
decoration), clay grinding, distribution, logistics, R&D activities (public and private), and 
training (in a university, vocational training centres, and other institutions). The main 
locations of the cluster are to be found (but not limited to) districts and towns around 
Castellon, namely l’Alcora, Onda and Villareal, covering around 20 square kilometres. 
Within the cluster, frits and glazing processing is the most important of the auxiliary 
industries (Meyer-Stamer et al., 2004; Hervas-Oliver and Albors-Garrigos, 2007).  The 
Castellon glazing industry is the world leader with 26 firms exporting around 66% of their 
total production and representing 70% of the world’s exports; and employing around 
3,200 workers in 2014 (Anffecc, 2014).  A key competitor is the Sassuolo (Italy) cluster, 
responsible for 40% of European production. 
 
4. Data sources, methods and contextualization 
For our research we have used the approach of a case study, a key instrument for gathering 
complex information (e.g., Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007), with 
secondary data analysis being utilised alongside in-depth semi-structured interviews.  
Following Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007), theory-building research using cases 
typically answers research questions that address “how” and “why” in unexplored 
research areas.  Our research achieved triangulation of data by posing specific questions 
to interviewees, engaging in discussion with experts in the industry and policy makers, 
and also by comparing results with secondary data, following Baxter and Eyles’s (1997) 
recommendations. This approach is also consistent with Yin (2008). The research setting 
is the Castellon ceramic tile MID, its evolution and entrepreneurship process since its 
inception in 1727, with special emphasis during the second part of the 20th Century where 
data is richer. The focal process is new firm formation and its learning mechanisms. In 
particular, we focused on learning processes and mechanisms that firms considered 
                                                 
5 Retrieved from www.ascer.es (March, 201th) 
8 
 
relevant for their ventures at the time of entry into the industry and territory.  Our research 
goes a step further and analyses different types of spinoffs (that is to say, de novo and 




4.1 Data sources 
We identified all active firms from rosters provided by industry associations (Ascer and 
Anffecc). The primary content of this study is based on the ceramic tile firms which 
constitute the core of the district. Indirectly, we also studied firms in other related 
industries (atomizers, frits, etc.) when ceramic tile firms spawned them or participated in 
their creation, in so much as we could also trace the vertical disintegration in the district.  
All in all, 167 firms were explored in-depth, using archival data and interviews.  
135 are ceramic tile firms, from which 25 firms were created before the 60s. Amongst 
these firms, 20 ceramic tiles were analysed just by using archival data from the Museums 
and other historical reports. Afterwards, 5 ceramic tiles created during the 60s and 110 
created during the following decades were all analysed mainly through interviews with 
the informants, although we triangulated data with secondary sources. Furthermore, 32 
firms analysed were frits and atomizers, being mainly created by ceramic tile firms since 
the 70s. In total, the 135 ceramic tile firms represent 54% of the total entrants during the 
20th Century (249 total entrants, 140 active in 2010).  More related data is offered below 
in tables 2a and 2b.  
 
With the interviews and secondary data our exploration process goes further than just the 
informants and their firms at the time of their constitution by tracking all their ancestors 
(parent firms) and the root of their genealogies, along with their potential spawns alike. 
For those 167 firms we worked with a total of 81 informants. In addition, some of the 
interviews were with key informants from the trade associations (ASCER or ANFFECC) 
but they were also founders or CEOs of local firms in tile related industries. N.B, some 
informants were parents that started many parent-based spinoffs, so the same informant 
described the whole genealogy of the family firms6.  
                                                 
6 It was frequently the case that, during interviews with companies, respondents would spontaneously mention the 
progenies their firms had spawned. From some historical data we were also able to identify entries going back to the 





Our study relies on several data sources including: (1) qualitative data from semi-
structured interviews; (2) emails, phone calls, informal meetings, visits to the ceramic tile 
fair trade in Castellon and follow-up interviews to track new firm formation; (3) archival 
data, including corporate documents and annual reports, along with three key archival 
sources that revealed who the founders of the firms were, and which were, if any, the 
parent companies.  These included:  La industria de la ceramica en Onda: 1778-19977, a 
publication of the ceramic museums of Onda, and the best source for tracking firms and 
their founders; and La industria ceramica de la plana de Castello, written by Membrado 
(2001). These two publications are publicly available. The third archival source was an 
Ascer (ceramic tile trade association) internal report that provides entry and exit data for 
ceramic firms in Spain8. (4) Lastly, the SABI database9 was also helpful for analysing 
shareholders in spawns which were active firms at the time of analysis, complemented by 
archival data from the commercial register when necessary.  
The primary data source was 60- to 120-minute, semi-structured interviews. With firm-
level informants, we focused on the company’s foundation history and the learning 
mechanisms at those times. Interviewed respondents (81) included: managers and ex-
managers (retired) of leading firms; industry association representatives in the cluster; 
and the managers of the two key ceramic tile museums (Onda and L’Alcora) in the cluster, 
who provided excellent retrospective accounts.  The same person could be interviewed 
twice or three times for purposes of data triangulation, over periods ranging from one to 
three hours.  Interviews were conducted over the years 2012, 2013 and 2014. Each 
interview consisted of two main parts: (1) the asking of general questions related to the 
collection of background information about the setting up of the firm, asking about 
potential disagreements, parents’ co-operation, family connections, and other matters; (2) 
the asking of direct questions related to the learning mechanism at the time of entry, 
directed to both parents and spawn alike.  
 
As regards chronology, we asked open questions that focused on entry experiences and 
learning mechanisms at the time of each firm’s foundation (e.g., “What did you learn 
                                                 
7 http://www.museoazulejo.org/es/publicaciones.php# 
 
8 We thank Michel Toumi, Ascer manager, for access to the data in this report.  




from your parents (employers) before starting up your own venture? How important were 
your parents’ networks for starting up? How much knowledge did you gain from your 
personal social ties before starting up? Did you cooperate with your parents after 
launching your own venture? At the time of formation, how important was it to locate 
there in the cluster, and why? How important, if any, were your parent company’s family 
ties in your venture’s formation?”). We then reviewed the chronology of the new venture 
creation.  Lastly, in order to provide a stronger grounding of theoretical insights 
(Eisenhardt, 1989), we conducted interviews with direct questions related to both 
mechanisms such as “Did all your knowledge come from your ex-employers? And, Do 
you think that agglomerations matter in relation to new firm formation in this cluster?”  
 
 
4.2 Contextualization: setting the historical evolution. 
The inception of the cluster with a first wave of entrepreneurial activity occurred in the 
early eighteenth century.  In 1727 the Earl of Aranda (Conde de Aranda) was 
commissioned by the Spanish king Philip V (Felipe V) to establish the Royal Ceramic 
Factory of Alcora (Real Fábrica de Alcora10). This company was active up until 193611. 
The Earl of Aranda commissioned French ceramic masters to help with the start up.  
Alcora was chosen as a location because of its already established Arab ceramic tradition, 
and because of the large presence of good quality red clay quarries. The Alcora industry 
was mainly dedicated to producing ceramic tableware products and artisanal tiles, based 
on the use of an Arab kiln tradition. At that time, 24 Arab kilns for making ceramic 
tableware and artisanal tiles were operating (Gomis, 1990). In the mid nineteenth century 
technicians from Staffordshire, United Kingdom, were also brought to Castellon (Ortells, 
2005). Therefore, although the first stages were marked by spin-offs and organizational 
reproduction triggered by the establishment of the Royal Ceramics Factory12, 
agglomeration was also playing an important role, attracting the Royal Ceramic Factory 
(RCF) in the first place. Up until the Second World War, the incipient agglomeration 
continued to evolve, based on craftsmanship and Arabic kilns.  However, it was not until 
                                                 
10 All Royal Factories were managed by the Spanish Army and its engineers.  
11 http://www.lalcora.es/es/content/historia-ceramica 
 
12 In the late eighteenth century the first spinoffs from the RCF occurred: in 1778 the firm Guinot (founded by Guino, 
with Mariano Jacinto and Juan Bautista, all RCF ex-employees) (Franch, UJI Doctoral Thesis); in 1780 a second spinoff 
founded by the French artisan (but located in Castellon) Joseph Ferrer, which later spawned others, such as Azulejos 
Mijares.  Then, in 1827 came La Camapana, in 1852 El Leon, in 1857 La Valenciana, and then La Esperanza ( Ortells 
Chabrera, Treball Societat Catalana Geografia, 58, 2005, pp.41).  
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the 1950-1960 period that the cluster had enough technical capabilities and a sufficient 
critical mass (49 companies in 1953 and 138 in 1969, rising later to 200 by 1999; 
Membrado 2001) to be considered a cluster as such, involving extensive relationships. 
See figure 1 for new firm entries per year for the 1900-2012 period (Ascer internal report: 
data for entries).  
 
Insert figure 1 here 
As predicted by the literature, an important boost to the cluster’s beginnings was the 
entrance of a diversifier (The Royal Ceramic Factory, a branch of the Spanish Army), 
which acted as a training centre and a source of spin-offs13 (Coll, 2009). These pioneering 
spin-offs also themselves spawned new companies14. A pattern of persistent family ties 
is present throughout the whole timeline of the cluster’s evolution, supported by the fact 
that all controlling families have been locally embedded entrepreneurs. The pattern of 
evolution described relates to Alcora and Onda. Another source of spin-offs was the 
Regional Ceramics School (Escuela Provincial de Ceramica). This training school was 
an important institution and a major source of new spin-offs during the decade prior to its 
closure at the time of the Spanish Civil War (in 1936).  As a measure of the school’s 
importance, it can be noted that it was a crucial player in the establishment in Onda of 30 
workshops in 1929, all spinoffs from the Ceramics School, while Alcora (the original 
location of the Royal Ceramics Factory) only saw 6 spinoffs in that year. Below, we 
describe events in successive post-war periods.  
 The 1950s.  
In Villareal, the ceramics industry was absent until the 1950s. Villareal is the place where 
the cluster consolidated and was the location for the most radical innovations generated 
during the second half of the 20th century. During the 1950s Villareal began to gain 
importance thanks to the entrance of new diversifiers.  These incomers had industrial 
(rather than artisanal) orientations.  Meanwhile, in Alcora and Onda the use of old, small 
workshops continued. In the early 1950s old ceramic factories (some of them with direct 
links to the mother Royal Ceramic Factory) co-existed with diversifiers from the orange 
industry;15 (Castellon has been a leading orange production centre in Spain for the last 
                                                 
13 For example, spin-offs included: La Primitiva, in 1857; La Campana, in 1827; and La Glorieta, founded in 1848. 
14 For instance, La Glorieta (1848-1966) spawned El Siglo in 1897 (surviving up until 1997). El Siglo in turn spawned 
El Molino (in 1922), a currently active firm (we interviewed the fifth generation of owners from the same original 
family in Cevisama Ceramic Fair Trade, 2012). 
15 In the early 1950s several unusual snowfalls froze the orange crops and companies in that field started to look for 
alternatives in other industries, such as ceramic tiles.  
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two centuries), from the furniture industry (local firms producing baskets for the oranges), 
and from the local construction industry, as well as from other local industries.  These 
entrants, all local entrepreneurs with extensive access to local information and 
knowledge, subsequently produced successful spin-offs 
 
The 1960s and 1970s. 
There was a new wave of spin-offs in the late 1960s, mainly due to the introduction of 
radical, new technology which served to separate the firing process into two steps: first, 
the firing of the clay; and, second, the decoration, that is to say the  application of  frits 
and glazes to the fired clay surface. Beyond de novo spinoffs, in-depth interviews showed 
very interesting examples of co-operation agreements between existing competitors in 
order to found new ventures.  
The late 1970s and 1980s. 
 
In the late 1970s and during the 1980s the technology used in ceramic tile firms transited 
from the twice-fired to the single-fired process (monocottura, invented by Marazzi16). 
This was one of the most important radical innovations in the cluster and triggered the 
establishment of many new firms. To begin with, the single-fired process was developed 
for floor tiles, but then the same technology was developed for making wall tiles. The 
main actors in the development of the technology were the leading Italian ceramic tile 
equipment company (Sacmi) and local, leading Castellon firms acting in alliances 
(including Porcelanosa, Zirconio, and Natucersa, among others).  The new single-fired 
process required new frits (to be fired together with the clay in conjunction), different 
processes, and new atomizers (new clay grinding processes for the single-fired process, 
named wet grinding). A wave of new companies appeared, mainly frits and glazing firms 
and atomizers.  Some new firms were multinational companies attracted from other 
ceramic tile clusters, 17 drawn in by the single-fire technology and its new decorative 
capabilities. Most of the new glazing companies were spawned by incumbent ceramic tile 
firms, founded either as a spin-off backed by a single parent18 or as one backed by a 
number of  cooperating local parent firms19.  Thus there were either single parent spinoffs 
                                                 
16 Cusmano et al., (2015) 
17 Colorobbia arrived in 1988 from Florence and Sassuolo, in Italy, and Johnson Matthey Ceramics came in 1990, 
from the Stoke-on-Trent ceramics cluster in the United Kingdom. 
18 For instance A la Plana spawned Vidres. 
19 For instance, Keraben and Wendel spawned Kerafrit. Porcelanosa and Ferro together spawned Esmalglass. 
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or parent-company joint venture spinoffs, while others were spin-offs spawned by frits 
firms20.  The new atomizers for the single-fired process21 were again firms spawned by 
local competitors acting in co-operation, i.e., parent-company joint ventures, 
collaborating in order to keep up with radical innovations.  
 
Later on during the 1990s and the 2000s the process of the founding of spin-offs and the 
entrance of new ventures continued.  In table 1 below, a summary of the main results of 
the historical process and major technological events are presented.   
 
Table 1 here  
 
5 Data analysis: mechanisms at work in the process of cluster formation and 
evolution in the Castellon MID 
 
5.1 Archival data analysis 
 
Overall, and according to the analysis of archival data, we herewith present the following 
findings: 
Insert table 2a here 
First, according to table 2a, 320 firms22 entered the Spanish ceramic tile industry during 
the 20th Century. Interestingly, around 77% of the new ventures were concentrated in the 
Castellon province, basically around Alcora, Onda and Villareal, while the rest of the new 
ventures were scattered all around Spain. Castellon registered a total of 249 firms out of 
320 in the ceramic tile industry. These figures do not account for frits or atomizers. In 
addition, in 1929, according to Onda Museum data, before the Civil War, 49 firms were 
identified in Onda, all of them entering during the late XIX Century and not registered by 
ASCER. The final figures, therefore, could be even higher and show a higher 
concentration. The highest entrance in Castellon started during the 50s (50s: 17; 60s: 28; 
70s: 39; 80s: 56) and showed a peak in the 90s (87). See table 2a. In terms of net creation 
of ceramic tile firms (entrance minus exits), according to table 2b, it is clearly shown how 
most firms created survived up to the late 90s. Later, especially in the 2000s (also 
reflected in figure 1), there was a total net variation of minus 77 firms, due mainly to the 
                                                 
20 For instance, Fritta spawned Coloronda 
21 Atomizadora was spawned by Peronda, Gaya Fores, Azulindus and Novogres. Atomix was spawned by Aparici, 
Gaya and Tau. Tierra Atomizada was spawned by Cerpa, Rocersa and Quimicer. 
22 Total population registered by ASCER in its historical archives for the 20th Century only for ceramic tiles.  
Nevertheless, starting from the XIX Century, 49 firms existed in 1929, just before the Civil War. 
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bursting of the real estate bubble in Spain23 and the Great Recession in Europe. Despite 
that manifest destruction of firms, Castellon, in net terms still has the highest 
concentration of the industry in Spain, 73.68% of all remaining firms. See table 2b 
Insert table 2b here 
Overall, this result indicates one interesting finding: Castellon’s cluster does present 
objective advantages. Put differently: agglomeration effects existed, as new ventures were 
primarily attracted there. This is one important idea not evidenced in Klepper’s works. 
 
Insert table 3 here  
 
Second, we have estimated that parent-backed or collaborative (joint venture) forms are 
the majority (around 61% of the sample) and family ties account for almost 40% of the 
sample, basically within those parent-spinoffs. In table 3 we observe how the proliferation 
of parent company joint ventures (CPJV) occurred mainly during the hard times of 
external shocks, such as after the Civil War (two CPJV, Tiles and Realonda in the 50s) 
and that of disruptions (transition to twice-fired and single-fired technological 
disruptions, late 60s up to early 80s). In particular, we documented 3 CPJV in the 60s, 6 
in the 70s and 4 in the early 80s: these newly created CPJV were made up of co-operation 
agreements amongst competitors, focused on surviving the new environments. 
Afterwards, in table 3, it is also shown how parent-spinoffs also followed a similar pattern 
(60s: 10; 70s: 23; 80s: 28). These parent-spinoffs have been pervasively found, but they 
were especially relevant during those technological transitions. During technological 
changes, technological heterogeneity clearly offers more opportunities to be taken 
advantage of by creating new ventures in order to cover different products or production 
techniques. Similarly, other different types of new entrants (diversifiers, de novo spinoffs, 
startups) were also pervasively encountered throughout the period. In total, from our 
sample of 167 firms, 61.7% of those new ventures were somewhat parent-backed ones 
and 38.3% were the conventional ones (de novo, startups, etc.). Amongst all of them, the 
parent-spinoff is the most frequent type of new venture created in the Castellon cluster. 
CPJV accounted for 9% of the total figure and it is a type of new entrant that has not been 
encountered again during the 90s and 2000s. See table 3.  
 
                                                 
23 It is worth noticing that ceramic tiles manufacturers mainly work for the construction industry, which 
has almost disappeared since 2007 due to the bursting of the real estate bubble suffered in Spain.  
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5.2 Parent-backed ventures: who are they? 
 
Parent-backed ventures, those parent-spinoffs and CPJV, are a direct consequence of the 
pervasive social ties and co-operation in the district. In the specific case of parent-
spinoffs, on the one hand, family ties, strong social ties, among others, are very interesting 
elements facilitating two main strategies. (i) Creation of new ventures by founders that 
continue also as owners (usually partial ownership) in other companies (in the parent 
company), thus forming groups of firms that are connected by sharing the same founders 
and/or managers. This guarantees the direct or indirect transfer of knowledge from one 
company to the other. Moreover, the networks of suppliers and other contacts are easily 
brought to the new firm because this one has direct access to the reputation and trust 
offered by the founder or parent. In this case, the firms are not competing ones, because 
the new ones are usually created to deal with other products or segments or just as 
subcontractors of the parent firm. Existing networks orchestrated by leading firms (in this 
case, parents) are vital for ID functioning, in so far as they provide legitimacy to access 
tacit knowledge (Scott, 1992:16).  (ii) Creation of new ventures in which the parent firm 
family members are transferred to manage (and partially own) the new venture: in this 
case, the parent company has a % of stake in the new one, and the new one deals with or 
focuses on other products or segments or is also used for outsourcing processes. In both 
cases the component “family” is intense and it guarantees exchange of knowledge and 
supports itself. Besides, as the Porcelanosa managers outlined, these family groups were 
also designed to minimize knowledge spillovers outside the groups and thus favour 
knowledge circulation just within the family.    
 
One example of a parent-spinoff company is one observed in Villareal. The founders of 
Azu-Vi also founded the spin-off Zirconio24 on an amicable and agreed basis, for 
extending the product range. This was a parent-backed spin-off.  Moreover, both 
companies, Azu-Vi and Zirconio co-operated ex-post the new firm’s creation over many 
years. Therefore, Porcelanosa25 included amongst its founders Mr. Soriano (one of the 
                                                 
24 The founders were also founders of Azu-Vi, along with an engineer, Mr. Pitarc, and also Mr. Barchi, an engineer 
from the Sassuolo ceramic tile cluster. 
25 It was the first company to introduce single-fired kilns in Castellon; the first to introduce the Rotocolor decorative 
technology (invented by System and tested in Porcelanosa for two years before being marketed); the first in the 
Castellon cluster to use white-body clay (red-body clay was and still is the  dominant material used in Castellon); the 
first to open retail stores; and the first to create a professional Marketing department, together with many other 
organisational and technological innovations. Its catalogue of products has been called the Bible of the industry, and 
each year it has served as an inspiration to local companies designing their own products.   
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founders of Azu-Vi and Zirconio), the Colonques family (diversifiers from the orange 
industry), Mr. Aclud (an Italian engineer from SACMI, a leading firm in the manufacture 
of equipment for ceramic tiles in the Sassuolo cluster, Italy), and the firm Bonet (from 
the frits and glazing sub-sector of the ceramic tiles industry). This firm, Porcelanosa, with 
multiple parents (including Mr. Soriano from Azu-Vi and Zirconio, SACMI and Bonet) 
was created because Mr. Soriano wanted to implement a new business model (white body 
instead or red, and the creation of their own stores for distribution; Mr. Soriano continued 
as shareholder within Azu-Vi and Zirconio) as did Mr. Aclud, but it was a parent-
company (incumbent-backed) venture from the Bonet point of view and a diversification 
for the Colonques family. This is one example of how new ventures can also be hybrid in 
nature, including many of the traditional forms, that is, a combination between a parent-
backed and a de novo one.  
 
CPJV, on the other hand, is the result of co-operation agreements between competitors 
(parent company joint ventures), usually from the same town, that try to adapt to new 
technology or to generate a collective initiative to assure the supply of some type of 
commodity for all of them. To adapt to a new technology, those agreements and the new 
ventures created were due to co-operation shown by a local (competitors) community of 
people, rather than between firms. This means that instead of controlling the new venture 
from the parent one (as a % of stake), it is the owner of the parent company who, 
individually, takes a % of stake in the new venture, avoiding the transfer of potential risks 
of failure to the parent company. All new founders kept working in their parent firms and 
all of them transferred knowledge to the new one. Thus, the flow of knowledge between 
the multiple parents and the progeny was pervasive even after the creation of the new 
venture, because both companies shared, at least in part, the same founders and even 
management26. Furthermore, we also reported cases (for the creation of atomizers, 
necessary in the transition to single-fired tech) where the firms themselves, and not the 
founders of them, took the % of stake in the new firms. In this case, these new firms were 
atomizers, providing to each member (shareholder) the atomized clay necessary for the 
single-fired production process. Again, social ties and belonging to the same town both 
influenced the creation of these CPJVs.  
 
                                                 
26 Most companies were and are SMEs, sharing ownership and management.  
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As regards these CPJVs, we described three examples but documented 15 in total. There 
may be more. After the Spanish Civil War, during the 40s, all industries were totally 
collapsed. In Onda and Alcora, the first two concentrations around Castellon, local 
businessmen with ceramic tile knowledge created the first two parent company joint 
ventures: Tilesa in Alcora and Realonda, in Onda. These firms were started by prominent 
business families who used to have factories before the war. All of them, previously 
competitors, joined to re-start businesses in the tile industry. Similarly, but due to 
technological disruptions, some new firms during the 60s and 70s, like Tau and Inalco, 
were established to leverage the benefits of the new technology.  Tau and Inalco were 
started in the late 1960s and early 1970s, respectively. They were spawned collectively 
by a coalition of local incumbents, or should we say, by a coalition of local ceramic tile 
competitors, and for some years after being formed they kept co-operating with the 
founders’ companies. The incumbent founders were all local competitors. Inalco and Tau 
only focused on the first step in the firing process, providing the “fired biscuits” (fired 
clay) to their founders; the founders’ companies then applied the second step in the 
process (decoration) which served to differentiate their products. Thus, Inalco and Tau 
were parent-company (joint) ventures, controlled by local existing competitors who co-
operated through the joint establishment of spin-offs for the purpose of keeping abreast 
of new technology27. As above mentioned, that co-operation occurred between local 
businessmen, who individually participated in the new firm while they kept working in 
their companies.  
The significance of the co-operation was remarked upon by one of the founders. During 
the interviews, one of the founders of Inalco (who is now a manager of another local 
firm28) [Mr. Carlos Cabrera] said:  
“The founding of Inalco was important not only as a signal that the cluster was evolving technologically 
in the right way……but it was the first time that we (families of the industry) evolved and shifted from being 
owners of our own factories to being partners and friends with local rival (families) 
competitors…something not previously usual in the process of founding new firms…a process mainly 
controlled by the families……albeit we were all then cooperating indirectly in other matters such as 
exporting, lobbying, and so forth…..” 
 
Not only was there co-operation between the founders, all of them competitors.  There 
was also co-operation between the new spin-offs and the founders’ own companies.  In 
another interview, the ex-manager of Tau remarked on the importance of knowledge 
                                                 
27 Inalco was created by Hispanoazul, Iberoalcorense, Color y Ceramica, Cabrera, and Torrecid y Plaza. Tau was 
created by Diago, Gómez-Gómez and Tilesa, as principal partners.  
28 Mr. Cabrera, CERACASA firm. 
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transmission from the founders’ own companies to the new spin-off [Mr. Carlos 
Camahort, ex-manager at Tau]: 
“During the setting up of the firm….I visited different factories with the founders, their own companies, 
learning, asking, questioning everything…..I had open doors to transfer knowledge to the new firm…Yes, I 
can assert that we inherited or learned from the best at that particular time and this was probably crucial 
for understanding our long term survival and innovation, outperforming our own founders when we 
detached from them….” 
Inalco and Tau were two examples of parent-company (joint) ventures. In fact, both 
spinoffs ended up in the late 1980s competing against their founders, when the technology 
used in ceramic tile firms was disrupted again by the introduction of the single-fired 
process29. Both spinoffs are now very innovative, active companies.  
 
This, undoubtedly, contributed to the vertical disintegration of the MID, providing a more 
intense division of labour as in Helfat’s (2015) way. Traditional de novo spinoff was 
continuously important but less relevant in periods of disruption. As observed, co-
operation agreements (parent-backed or joint ventures) are pervasive. Family ties are also 
important. In table A-1, in the Appendix, we show some examples of parent-backed 
spinoffs, both parent-spinoffs and CPJV, among other de novo ventures.  
 
 
5.3 Analysis of interviews 
We also synthesized data from interviews in order to explicitly track learning mechanisms 
in each firm. Specifically we assess what was explicitly learnt and by whom, trying 
always to disentangle different sources such as ex-employers, social ties, parent’s 
networks and so forth. We assessed explicit learning from informants’ articulated 
statements in response to our above mentioned direct and indirect questions.  
 
 
“It is impossible to tell you that (the creation of) our firm was based on a disagreement with our parents.  
Our firm had many parents and reasons (for being established), not solely one, as you insist… We kept co-
operating with our parents in some activities at the point of our firm’s establishment, even though we 
wanted to create a new way of doing things, turning from red to white clay, opening stores… Our partners 
in that new venture were all local people from the industry with their own firms. We knew and trusted one 
another. It was just about co-operating and forming new firms in order to face new problems and 
opportunities in the industry…. Nothing in the process of firm creation in this cluster, to the best of my 
knowledge, is black or white, agreement or disagreement based; we had been co-operating in many other 
                                                 
29 Both companies were acquired by some of their founders. This means that they did not fail, but continued 
with different shareholders. Had we simply measured survival rates, the two companies would have 
disappeared from the counts; but in fact they continued as competing companies. Tau transited to the single-
fired process in 1984. At the present time (2014) they are both significant players in the industry, especially 





previous ventures… and also with many others who voluntarily established their own way….This is the 
usual way of doing business here. It does not mean that co-operation is the only way, but it is very extensive 
here….” 
 
--Extract from an interview with a senior manager at Porcelanosa-- 
 
 For the sake of brevity we provide a summary of our most significant results. A full 
genealogical map and detailed data is available upon request. In short, our case has 
followed a completely different pattern from those in the literature which show 
organisational reproduction as occurring through de novo spin-offs and which are 
accompanied by analyses of survival rates. Overall, during all the entrepreneurial waves 
in Castellon, it was found that ex-post co-operation between founders and new firms was 
persistent, and was reinforced by family and personal linkages and also through inter-
firm sub-contracting agreements.  Most of the company managers and founders  
originated from the same region, lived and socialized in the same neighbourhoods, were 
mainly trained in the same engineering school (Universitat Jaume I and ITC), and shared 
membership of the same trade associations (such as Ascer, ATC, and Anffecc) and social 
clubs.  One key fact was that all new entrepreneurs were local. This induced strong 
personal ties which facilitated networking, trust and co-operation. This extensive and 
intense social structure cannot be captured simply by analysis of   entry and exit rates. In 
table 4 we summarise our main findings, where de novo spinoffs and agglomeration 
forces are intertwined, forming rather hybrid new ventures. See table 4  
Insert table 4 here 
 
As shown in table 4, our results suggest a clear reconciliation between the two 
approaches. Although the relevance of the agglomeration perspective stands out, the 
inheritance approach’s value is also clearly supported and it is pervasive. In fact, it can 
be said that the MID perspective complements, expands and enriches the inheritance 
approach. Put differently, the knowledge legacy from incumbent parents is always 
stressed, but it is in coalition with agglomeration and socially-based co-operation.   
 
Below we   highlight our main findings:  
 
First, it is clear that having local insider status is directly relevant to the learning process 
in agglomerations.  It means that new entrants from the local, focal industry, new entrants 
from other co-located industries (local diversifiers), and even local startups enjoy superior 
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ex-ante tacit knowledge due to privileged access to contacts, network ties and social 
capital, albeit to different degrees.  As Sorenson and Audia (2000:426) show, without 
prior experience in the industry, a potential entrepreneur will find it difficult to benefit 
from the local social structure. Our evidence confirms similar findings in other works 
(Agarwal et al., 2004; Agrawal, Cockburn and McHale, 2006). As Agrawal et al, (2006) 
show, the social relationships that facilitate knowledge flows are very important, to the 
extent that co-location within an institutional context endures over time. The vast majority 
of the new firms in the Castellon cluster30 were started by local entrepreneurs from the 
focal and other, even non-related, industries.  Before the creation of their new firms, 
founders had abundant information about production issues and the local environment, 
mostly tacit in nature, and had important social ties, which minimized the prospects of 
failure. This fact confirms the salience of observations in the literature which states that 
entrepreneurs might be locally embedded (Figueiredo et al., 2002; Stuart and Sorenson, 
2003; Agrawal et al., 2006; Dahl and Sorenson, 2009). Beyond formal inter-firm 
relationships with the parent’s network, informal and personal-based ties also matter. 
Those personal-based ties not only derive from the parent’s networks but also from the 
new entrepreneur’s own social structure, which develops inside the networks of the 
parent. Conciliating both views, Buenstorf and Klepper (2009:714-715) point out that 
entry was largely an indigenous phenomenon….potential entrants are assumed to have 
economic knowledge, a fact also sustained by Figueiredo et al., (2002). Moreover, we do 
recognize the fact that familiarity with the home region may (partially) substitute for 
objective advantages of agglomeration (Figueiredo et al., 2002; Buenstorf and Klepper, 
2010). Our study’s results indicate, however, that the agglomeration effects were 
objective and existed, and these were probably exploited mainly by local insiders who 
had pre-entry information about them. According to the interviews, we can also state that 
all new entrants were local business people: home entry is more pronounced in 
agglomerated regions, perhaps due to the agglomeration effects which permit even 
stronger and better arrangements for organizing new ventures by connecting available 
local resources. We also think that local business people knew the existence of those 
agglomeration effects before entry, diminishing information asymmetries.  
 
                                                 
30 With the exception of some multinational companies which established a branch in Castellon: Ferro (USA), Johnson 
Matthey (UK), Colorobbia (Italia), Marazzi (Italia), mainly in the frits and glazing industry, albeit needing local 
partners to enter; e.g. Marazzi entered in partnership with Gaya and Peñarroya, both local producers. 
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Second, as shown in table 2a, the focal cluster does present objective advantages. Put 
differently: agglomeration effects attracted new ventures, as the vast majority of the new 
entrants during the 20th Century clustered around Castellon, being mostly or entirely local 
business people. This fact strengthens the agglomeration effects pointed out in the two 
literatures, although more strongly in the MID approach. It is important to stress that the 
first Artisan School of Ceramics in Spain was established in 1929 at Onda (Castellon) 
and the first Spanish Royal Factory for Ceramics (1727) was also established in Alcora 
(Castellon), along with the availability of the best red clay quarries for ceramics. 
Undoubtedly, these historical antecedents could have supported the confirmation of those 
externalities in the area. 
 
Third, parent’s networks, based on subcontracting, are learning mechanisms for new 
ventures, in addition to the internal conduits between spinoffs and parents. Results 
suggest a strong co-operation phenomenon, based on inter-firm subcontracting 
relationships. This network-based co-operation process permits new ventures to learn 
from their parents’ networks, assuring their survival and development at the time of entry. 
Parents’ networks are useful for guaranteeing that new ventures will get off the ground 
(Hellmann, 2002; Stuart and Sorenson, 2003).  
Fourth, the above subcontracting co-operation process is reinforced by the identification 
of specific co-operation agreements in relation to the formation of new firms. We have 
identified firms which, on an agreement basis, spawned other firms (parent-backed spin-
offs), followed by intensive cooperation between founding firms and their spin-offs.  
Results also suggest there were extensive co-operation processes among incumbent 
competitors who joined together to form new joint ventures (company parent joint 
ventures). Competitors co-operated in order to be more competitive by minimizing the 
risk of transiting to the use of radical technologies by sharing their costs and learning 
processes.  
Fifth, we also identified old established local families who owned firms dating back to 
the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century who created new firms for family 
members. These “family” co-operations were reinforced by traditional (vertical and 
horizontal) inter-firm knowledge exchange. In some cases we could only track the 
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families, rather than the companies, due to the fact that in some cases different members 
of a family with the same name collectively controlled a complex group of firms31 .  
 
The above four points suggest that agglomerations constitute learning environments 
which foster entrepreneurship and new firm formation by offering new ventures at the 
time of entry access to superior knowledge. Moreover, the learning environment is also 
beneficial for parents: they combine external (externalities) and internal knowledge to 
create superior knowledge which may eventually be transmitted to their progenies, 
reinforcing the role played by internal conduits mentioned by inheritance approach. 
 
Sixth, we also identified de novo entrepreneurial spinoffs, spinoffs which did not engage 
in co-operation after entry with their parents.  
 
In figure 2 below we present graphical examples of the types of new firms in the cluster 
(2-A, the Cotanda and Piñon family group; 2-B, parent spin-off around Porcelanosa; 2-
C, parent company ventures to initiate Tau; and 2-D, parent company ventures to initiate 
Atomizadora), complementing thus Table 2. More examples are available upon request.   
Insert figure 2 here 
 
As observed, both legacy and agglomerations co-existed in the formation of the Castellon 
cluster.  
 
5.4 Discussion of findings 
As regards CPJV, the collective action of facing new radical technology adoption by 
creating new ventures funded by existing competitors’ co-operation agreements is a novel 
finding that shows how radical the technologies to force existing competitors to co-
operate were, shedding light on how a socially-based entrepreneurial process plays a key 
role in the transition of the cluster to a new growth stage. This directly relates to and 
complements the cluster life cycle view.  As suggested by Menzel and Fornahl 
(2010:219), the increase in heterogeneity permits a cluster to move back in the cycle, 
entering into a new growth stage, especially when the changes that increase heterogeneity 
are of a more radical nature, as in the case of the transition to the twice-fired and the 
                                                 
31 Such families included: Peris, Nomdedeu, Diago, Gomez, Gaya, and Sanchis, amongst others. 
23 
 
single-fired production systems in Castellon. Beyond traditional vertical subcontracting 
and horizontal informal exchange of know-how, confronting radical changes that threaten 
the existence and survival of the local firms, even competitors have collaborated to start 
new ventures in order to adapt to new radical technologies: to the very best of our 
knowledge, this is the first time this phenomenon is documented in the study of 
clusters/industrial districts.  
As aforementioned, a firm’s construction of capabilities goes beyond a firm’s boundaries 
and competitive interactions generate relational capabilities (De Carolis et al., 1999) and 
returns (McEvily and Zaheer, 1999). In particular, social ties or informal relations 
amongst the local community of business people facilitated the necessary co-operation to 
cope with increasing heterogeneity, and the cluster itself entered again in a new growth 
period with superior productivity. Our case is connected to the Menzel and Fornahl (2010) 
framework as it provides real evidence about cluster rejuvenation and how socially-based 
ties play a crucial role in supporting and facilitating transition across stages. 
 
Similarly, most of the parent-backed spinoffs occur from the social base that joins the 
different actors: most of them were and presently are socially tied (especially family-
based ones). As many informants stated, backing and promoting new ventures, mainly 
for subcontracting processes or for the creation of new capabilities for new product lines 
(e.g. extending from red to white-body clay products), was also a way to create a 
decentralized network-based production system that enabled the circulation and 
generation of knowledge just within the family, thus minimizing knowledge spillovers 
outside the groups.   
 
All in all, our study has gone one step further in the debate because we found that there 
was not one but three different types of spin-off contributing to the industry 
agglomeration process. Two of these spin-offs were different from those identified by 
Klepper, and have not previously been referred to in the cluster literature. They are, 
following the seminal Helfat and Lieberman (2002) study: (i) multi-parent company joint 
ventures, forged by a coalition of local rivals; and, (ii) incumbent-backed spinoffs (parent 
spinoffs) which also then co-operated with their parents. These new ventures did not fit 
in the traditional classification of “de novo”, “diversifiers” and “startups”, but 
nevertheless participated in cluster formation, and created and transmitted knowledge. 
They provided a clear demonstration of the role played by agglomeration, and by 
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extensive social capital in the Castellon ceramic tile MID. Moreover, the way these two 
types of spin-offs operated contradicted most of the taken for granted assumptions about 
spin-off processes in the inheritance approach. Klepper and colleagues focus mainly on 
de novo spinoffs without considering other alternative ones, such as the corporate-parent 
spinoff suggested by Helfat and Lieberman (2002). Obviously, the lack of relationship 
between parents and progenies emphasizes the potential influence of cooperation or the 
network effect, because that lack of relationship also excludes a new venture from being 
closely connected to the former parent’s network and thus having access to those flows 
of external knowledge. As Buenstorf and Klepper (2009:731) remark, a recurrent finding 
is that spinoffs had little ongoing relationship with their parent firms…nor transaction 
with their parents…..they were motivated by a disagreement with their parent firm. While 
this is also true of clusters, it is not the only way spinoffs prevail in clusters. 
In table 5 we summarise the mechanisms at work in the cluster formation and evolution 
process, with the purpose of providing a clear answer to our research question.   
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Period Characterised by 
1727 to  1900 -Inception and fermentation. The first entry of a diversifier (Royal Ceramics Factory) (from the Army, 
which controlled most of the Royal Factories). Agglomerations formed based on extensive use in the 
area of the Arab kiln tradition.  There were 22 Arab Kilns working at that time in ceramic table ware. 
Key was access to high quality red clay quarries. Local insider status was prominent in waves of spinoffs. 
Spinoffs occurred directly from the Royal Ceramics Factory (e.g. Guinot, La Valenciana, La Campana, 
La Esperanza, and El Leon. All of them were founded by Royal Ceramics Factory ex-employees). The 
influence of agglomerations was less important. The role of parent-progeny knowledge transfer was 
crucial.  
1900 up to 1950 The spin-off process was important, and was mainly based on family ties. In 1946, 38 companies in the 
area accounted for 60% of Spanish production (Membrado, 2011). The Ceramics School was established 
in Onda (existing 1929-1936) as a training school for artisans, and was a source of new spinoffs –The 
influence of inter-firm ties was important, and complex family business groups were becoming 
prominent. The influence of local cluster insider status was strong, and the effect of agglomeration, with 
local institutions, was increasing in importance– The Civil War in 1936 stopped production up until the 
1940s.  Technology was very low with Arab kilns.  
The 1950s The entrance of local diversifiers was important, and resulted in the industrialising of an artisanal 
industry (especially in Villareal). The influence of local cluster insider status was strong. New firms 
co-existed with old family controlled manufacturers dating back to previous centuries (in Onda and 
Alcora). Inter-firm ties based on subcontracting developed. The effects of agglomeration were starting 
to be important. 
1960s and1970s There was an entrance of local diversifiers and the occurrence of a very important spin-off process. 
Inter-firm ties grew in importance.  The influence of local cluster insider status was prominent. There 
occurred the formation of new firms through rivals’ co-operation agreements in the face of the 
threat/opportunity of radical innovations (related to the new twice-fired process). Institutions in the 
area increased, and at the regional level new research institutions were set up, including the ceramic 
tile research laboratory in Valencia University, Valencia. Extensive co-operation based on 
subcontracting was evident, as long as the division of labor intensified. The cluster was achieving a 
critical mass and there is evidence of very strong agglomeration effects. Technology was disrupted by 
the twice-fired process.  
1980s No more diversifiers entered, but spin-offs played an important part.  A skilled labour pool was 
consolidated, and there was high labour mobility. Very important institutions were created.  Trade 
associations, a vocational training centre, and other institutions were developed, including the 
international trade fair (Cevisama).  The ceramic tile research laboratory in Valencia was consolidated 
and transferred to Castellon as the ITC. The influence of local cluster insider status was prominent. New 
firms were founded through rivals’ co-operation agreements in the face of the threat/opportunity of a 
second radical innovation (single-fire). Extensive co-operation based on subcontracting occurred. 
Multinational companies from the Sassuolo cluster in Italy entered the cluster. There occurred very 
strong agglomeration effects. Second important tech disruption (single-fire). 
1990s The spin-off process decreased in importance.  There were no more entrances of local diversifiers. A 
skilled labour pool had been consolidated and there was high labour mobility. The influence of local 
cluster insider status was prominent. The local University Jaume I, along with the ITC, offered 
ceramics industrial engineering courses. Strong co-operation networks were pervasive.  The cluster had 
become a meta-cluster and included all the necessary value chain activities. An “innovation system” 
was fully operational with extensive co-operation networks and institutional support. There was an 
increase of multinational companies. Agglomeration effects were very strong. 
2000s The spin-off process was overall important with some significant ones (e.g. Kerajet, a new spinoff, 
instigated a new technological disruption through the invention of new digital ceramic decoration 
methods). There occurred a high number of entrants into the cluster of diversifiers from the inkjet 
industry (participating in the technological breakthrough based on the new process of digital 
decoration). New entrants from outside allied with local firms (testifying to the importance of cluster 
insider status). The skilled labour pool was consolidated and there was high labour mobility. Existing 
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institutions were consolidated and developed a powerful lobby capacity towards regional and central 
government. A world-class ceramic tile cluster had been established. There were very strong 
agglomeration effects. After 2005 the cluster leapfrogged its rival in Sassuolo, Italy, by developing the 
new ceramic digital decoration technology. In 2006 production peaked at 600 million square metres, 
and employees numbered 25,000, surpassing Sassuolo on all levels (see more in Hervas-Oliver and 




















1960-1970 1970-1980 1980-1990 1990-2000 2000-2010 TOTAL 
CASTELLON 
* 49 firms in 1929 
2 66.6% 1 33.3% 2 66.6% 2 40% 1 20% 17 89.47% 28 71.79% 39 76.47% 56 81.16% 87 82.86% 14 77.78% 249 77.81% 
OUTSIDE CASTELLÓN 1 33.3% 2 66.6% 1 33.3% 3 60% 4 80% 2 10.53% 11 28.21% 12 23.53% 13 18.84% 18 17.14% 4 22.22% 71 22.19% 
TOTAL 3 100% 3 100% 3 100% 5 100% 5 100% 19 100% 39 100.% 51 100.00% 69 100.00% 105 100.00% 18 100.00% 320 100.00% 
*percentage calculated for the whole period 1900-2010 (total number of companies: 320); Source: own elaboration from ASCER data. Nevertheless, in 1929 a total of 49 firms existed in Onda 
and Alcora, entering during the 19th Century 
 
Table 2b  Percentages of net (entries-exits) ventures entering  inside and outside the Cluster during 20th Century  
1900-1910 1910-1920 1920-1930 1930-1940 1940-1950 1950-1960 1960-1970 1970-1980 1980-1990 1990-2000 2000-2010 TOTAL 
CASTELLON 
* 49 firms in 1929 
2 66.67% 1 33.33% 2 66.67% 2 40.00% 1 20.00% 17 89.47% 28 71.79% 39 76.47% 56 81.16% 69 83.13% -77 85.56% 140 73.68% 
OUTSIDE CASTELLÓN 1 33.33% 2 66.67% 1 33.33% 3 60.00% 4 80.00% 2 10.53% 11 28.21% 12 23.53% 13 18.84% 14 16.87% -13 14.44% 50 26.32% 
TOTAL 3 100% 3 100% 3 100% 5 100% 5 100% 19 100% 39 100% 51 100% 69 100% 83 100% -90 100% 190 100% 
*percentage calculated for the whole period 1900-2010 (total number of companies: 320); Source: own elaboration from ASCER data. Nevertheless, in 1929 49 firms existed in Onda and Alcora, 

















Table 3 Type of new entrants in our sample during the 20th Century 
Type of new ventures CPJV Parent Spinoff Other (de novo, diversifiers…) Total by period 
Years Absolute % per period %per type Absolute % per period %per type Absolute % per period %per type Absolute %per period 
1900-1950 0 0.0% 0.0% 5 71.4% 5.7% 2 28.6% 3.1% 7 100.0% 
1950-1960 2 14.3% 13.3% 5 35.7% 5.7% 7 50.0% 10.9% 14 100.0% 
1960-1970 3 11.5% 20.0% 10 38.5% 11.4% 13 50.0% 20.3% 26 100.0% 
1970-1980 6 15.8% 40.0% 23 60.5% 26.1% 9 23.7% 14.1% 38 100.0% 
1980-1990 4 8.5% 26.7% 28 59.6% 31.8% 15 31.9% 23.4% 47 100.0% 
1990-2000 0 0.0% 0.0% 15 48.4% 17.0% 16 51.6% 25.0% 31 100.0% 
2000-2010 0 0.0% 0.0% 2 50.0% 2.3% 2 50.0% 3.1% 4 100.0% 
Total (1900-2010) 15 9.0% 100.0% 88 52.7% 100.0% 64 38.3% 100% 167 100.0% 





Table 4 Mechanisms at work during the process of formation and evolution of the 
Castellon MID cluster 
Mechanisms: building theory Some representative quotes: 
Local cluster insider status.  This provides access to local 
inter-firm networks and informal personal ties within and 
beyond those of the parent. Consequently, agglomerations in 
MIDs are more easily accessed by local entrepreneurs than by 
new entrants from other regions. 
Intensive social capital or social structure favours “local 
entrepreneurs”, entrepreneurship, the development of 
knowledge asymmetries, and the creation of barriers to entry for 
outsiders. Outsiders cannot access channels and networks under 
the same conditions.  
“Most entrants were and are local entrepreneurs from local business 
families…they had all the resources, beyond the financial ones to 
startup and succeed in the industry….. connections. partnerships. 
reputation to hire….” 
 “Yes, we knew outsiders….they brought money…but they all needed a 
local businessman to access the cluster…..” 
“Businessmen from other regions also invested….especially in the 60’s. 
but always backed by local businessmen who advised and shared 
partnerships…..” 
“Outsiders. especially those from the Italian cluster. are not our people 
but help to do things differently….I do not think they access the same 
information and know-how we all do…, we all know  each other who 
can be or can not be trusted….” 
“Personal ties are more important than formal inter-firm 
agreements….my friends mostly work for the industry and we regularly 
meet for a meal…of course we share issues…you have to live and 
socialise here to keep learning…..” 
“Some of my rivals’ managers are also my friends and we were all 
trained in the same school…It does not mean we share everything….but 
we respect each other’s view and opinions about current affairs….” 
“How do we learn? From the loads of people you know here in the 
local industry….and of course your industry experience matters …it is 
not only about industry experience but whom you worked for before…” 
Working and socialising in the cluster gives you knowledge about most 
of the key issues…” 
“….learning from suppliers. customers. your work mates….and your 
personal ties: ...when we started up we kept working with the same ex-
employer’s suppliers, it was easy and the only way to get on because we 
trusted them….” 
“… my friends also work in the industry and when we meet we just talk 
about ceramics and making money…. my dad was here for 30  
years…he knows who to ask and meet when necessary…all this 
knowledge and connections go with you wherever you work in this 
industry….” 
“What knowledge from networks do you mean? Of course you learn 
from your ex-employer’s suppliers and  customers…but most of the 
useful knowledge is not officially from the inter-firm relationships but 
from the personal ties you cultivate with those suppliers’ 
workers….you’ve got them no matter where you move to….” 
Parent’s subcontracting-based networks as learning 
mechanisms.  Agglomeration matters. Fostering 
entrepreneurship by providing insiders with access to extra-
resources (including networks, intermediate inputs, and 
knowledge). Agglomeration complements the spinoff 
knowledge transmission mechanism.  
New entrepreneurs in MIDs learn from the existing parents’ 
networks. New ventures tend to co-locate with the networks of 
parents because accessing those localized resources helps to 
assure survival and development. Agglomeration (composed of 
inter-firm and personal networks) matters before and after entry. 
It provides an additional asset, the value of which is reinforced 
by local insider status and pre-entry industry experience.  
Parent-backed spinoffs mainly from family groups.  New 
ventures include  parent-backed spinoffs, including many 
belonging to family groups. 
The existence of continuous co-operation with the parent-
company means that new ventures keep learning from the 
parent’s networks and also from the parent’s internal conduits at 
the time of entry and post-entry.   
 
“You see firm A. B. C and D. they are all family….different brands but 
we all know they do not compete…..no. they do not need cross-
sharing….the family itself owns all the four  firms32….” 
“Sometimes companies supported new spinoffs for members of the 
family who decided to become entrepreneurs….creating new firms for 
complementing or expanding the current products…the support 
persisted with or without explicit and formal ties….” 
Do you know Kerajet, the digital decoration disrupter? It was a high-
risk project that Ferro did not want to have inside. No one wanted that 
                                                 
32 Firms A = Aparici, B= Apavisa, C=Superceramica, D= Undefasa, all from the Aparici family. 
38 
 
responsibility….they decided to spin it off and gave support with 25% 
share and access to the R&D labs….thanks to that decision Castellon 
leapfrogged to digital printing for ceramic decoration….  They (Ferro) 
regret not holding on to the new firm….. although they keep working 
together.”  Ferro did their best to provide the new inks for the new 
technology33….” 
Company parent joint ventures.  These are enterprises 
founded by companies who co-operate specifically to create 
spinoffs.  In some cases the co-operators are also incumbent 
competitors. 
Through continuous co-operation the new joint ventures learn 
from the parents’ networks and also from the parents’ internal 
conduits at the time of entry and post-entry.   
Agglomeration is crucial for favouring local joint ventures, 
including among local competitors. 
“It was a way to pass from being an owner to being a partner with my 
competitor! We could not access the new technology 
individually….forming those partnerships allowed us to be at the 
forefront of the new technology. All the partners brought their best 
technicians to be sure the new firm worked…so I suppose we all taught 
the new workers how to do things….(referring to the creation of 
INALCO34).” 
“Our parents gave us all the necessary knowledge and training during 
the first decade …Then, a second (technological)  disruption came (i.e. 
the single-fired method), also changing ownership…We ended up 
competing against our parents in the advent of the second 
disruption….we learnt from all of them…”  
Learning mechanisms through the parent’s internal 
conduits.  De novo entrepreneurial and disagreement-based 
spinoffs occur in MIDs and contribute to spatial industry 
clustering in the manner described by Klepper.  
Learning is transmitted through conduits linking the new firms 
to their parents. At the same time, learning at the time of entry 
also occurs through the parents’ networks and through local 
personal ties.  
 
“Yes, some new firms arose from conflicts and different points of 
view…yes, disagreements are also motives for new ventures and they 
do not usually keep working together…except when they are 
family…this is different.  It all depends on who they are…..” 
“People start up because they think they can do it better…once they 
learn know-how. knowing-who…the environment helps to start up, also 
the personal connections and ties…it is impossible to start from 
scratch: if you start up in this industry you need the environment to 
survive…” 
“…yes, they had a disagreement with their ex-employers because of the 
too-late adoption of the digital technology…..and they started by 
developing new software for improving colour composition with that 
technology: they developed it with the same supplier they used to work 
with at their ex-employer’s…yes, the new firm used the same 
network…” 





Table 5 Summary of the mechanisms at work in the cluster formation and evolution 
process in the Castellon MID: inheritance and agglomeration forces at play. 
New ventures in the 
cluster 
Who entrepreneurs were? Learning 
mechanisms 





Local entrepreneurs from the focal 
industry. 
Also, local entrepreneurs from 
local diversifying industries. 





-Personal ties with 
local co-workers 
Inheritance and agglomeration 
mechanisms important. 
Parent’s internal conduits are key. In 
addition, local insider status pervasive 
and persistent. 
Agglomerations complement the 
inheritance process for firm creation.  
                                                 
33 Also in Hervas-Oliver and Albors-Garrigos (2014). 
34 Carlos Cabrera, manager at Ceracasa (Ceracasa founder’s son).  The firm Ceracasa was one of the INALCO founders (along with 





Local entrepreneurs from the local 
and focal industry, mainly from 
within family groups. 





conduits: pre- and 
post-entry 
-Parent’s networks: 
pre- and post-entry 
-Personal ties with 
local co-workers 
Inheritance, agglomeration and socially-
based MID mechanisms important.  
Spinoffs based on extensive co-
operation. 
Agglomeration and socially-based co-
operation both complement the 
inheritance process for firm creation. 
Corporate parent 
joint venture (CPJV) 
Local firms from the focal 
industry. 




conduits: pre- and 
post-entry 
-Parent’s networks: 
pre- and post-entry 
 
Inheritance, agglomeration and socially-
based MID mechanisms important.  
Spinoffs based on extensive co-
operation amongst incumbent 
competitors. 
Agglomeration and socially-based co-
operation, both  complement the 






Table A-1 Some examples of the organisational reproduction in Castellon MID and main 
mechanisms prevailing 




Family co-operation/de novo 
spinoff 
Vertical disintegration 





- - El Siglo (1897-1997), de novo 











- Family ties extensive; basically the 
same shareholders from Azuvi 
(Azuvi did not own Zirconio but 
Azuvi’s shareholders individually 
did) 
Changing from 
traditional to tunnel kiln 
technologies in the 60’s 
TAU (1967) Yes  
100% 
- Yes (Diago. Gomez 











- Family ties relevant (parent owner 
and the partial owner and CEO of 
new firm were brothers) 
Twice-fired 
Peronda (1969)  Yes. 
 100% 
Peris y Cia 
(1951-1969) 
- Family ties very intense; family 
split company in new ones, one for 






- Yes (Nomdedeu, 
La Platera and 
MYR) 
Family ties important Twice-fired  








No family ties but all new 
shareholders from the same 





leader in tiles 
Yes. 100%*** C. Bonet (1957) 







- Soriano Family leaves Zirconio (de 
novo spinoff) 
New white body 
ceramic tile and 
pioneering single-fired 
process and innovation 
in downstream activities 




Yes. 100% Porcelanosa. 
(1973). securing 
frits and glazes 
(parent-backed) 
 
- Ferro (1959): engineers from Ferro 
(Baigorri brothers, now Presidents 
of ANFFECC, frits trading 
association) leave and join 




Porcelanosa to create Esmalglass 





- Yes (Ceramicas 
Aparici, Gaya, Tau) 
No family ties Single-fired (clay 
grounding)  
Atomix (1980) Yes  
100% 
- Yes (Ceramicas 
Aparici, Gaya, Tau) 
























- - De novo spinoff. Javier Rupert’s 
disagreement with Zirconio (1965) 
This firm was the first 
diffusing porous single-
fire for wall ties in 
Brazil, as its founder 
invented it while at 
Zirconio, Boix and 
Rupert families on the 
Board of Directors 
 
Division of labour: 
Special tiles by 
extrusion technologies 





La Platera - Family ties very intensive - 
Source: own. Based on our research. For the sake of brevity, full genealogy map available upon request. * The origin of the new 
firm’s entrepreneurs is local, from the same or different industry; ** Bought in 2011 by a Chinese entrepreneur from Foshan cluster 
(China); *** Mr. Aclud was an Italian engineer from Sassuolo living in Castellon. 
 
 
